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This paper is one of a series originating in the inquiry into long-term
trends in capital formation and financing in the United States. The
project was nitated in mid- 1950 at the suggestion of the Life Insur-
ance Association of America and with its financial assistance.
Within the inquiry, Dr. Ulmer's study deals with trends in capital
formation and financing in public utilities,one of the more important
capital-using and demanding sectors of the nation'seconomy. Because
of obvious differences among the several utilities inage, size, character
of production and of market, the study proceeded by buildingup the
long-term records, first for real capital formation and then forfinanc-
ing, for each major subsectorbeginning with the steam railroads.
The present paper is thus a summary of the first part ofa much wider
study.
The new estimates of capital expenditures by steam railroads since
1870, which Dr. Ulmer compiled, permita telling analysis of the
process of capital formation in a basic industry over a significant part
of its life history; and the less continuous but illuminating estimatesof
sources and uses of funds are equally eloquent in describing the striking
trends in the sources of financing. There is little thatcan or should be
added here to the story unfolded in Dr. Ulmer'spaper. But it may be
of interest to relate the major findings for the steam railroadsto similar
findings for other sectors in the economy. Among these findingsare
(a) the long swings in gross and net capital formation; (b) the trend
in the capital-output ratio; and (c) the shift in thesources of financing.
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Dr. Ulmer's work shows that the long-term trend of capital formation
in railroads was upward to about 1910 and downward thereafter. In
addition, his record discloses shorter-term fluctuations closely conform-
ing to cycles in general business and towering swings whose average
duration is either seventeen or twenty years (see Charts 2, 4, and 7).
Dr. Ulmer points out that identification of one of these swings may
be questionable in the 1880's when a pronounced contraction in gen-
eral business conditions is reflected in the five-year moving averages of
railroad capital formation, but is much less significant in the nine-year
moving averages. There are also difficulties in any precise dating of the
pcaks and troughs in such long swings. But such questions and ohstacis
need not deter us from recognizing that these swings exist as a distinct
component of change; and one whose amplitude, at least in the case
of capital formation by railroads, is striking to the point of dominating
the record.
rrhis finding is rendered all the more important by the evidence of
swings of similar duration and, for sonic records, of not much narrower
amplitude, in other major economic processes. They exist in residen-
til construction, as Dr. Blank's Technical Paper1 in the present series
and several earlier studies in the field indicate. They appear in net
c:apital exports or imports, i.e. the net changes in foreign claims. They
exist in net immigration to this country, as various studies in the field
and a forthcoming paper on the subject by the National Bureau of
Economic Research will indicate. Arid while their amplitude is much
narrower, they can be discerned in the rate of growth of so compre-
hensive a total as gross national product in constant prices.
On the basis of our preliminary studies a rough chronology of these
long swings can be attempted. in this attempt, summarized below, we
forego the effort to assign peaks and troughs to single years, since this
might lend specious precision to the result. Instead, we refer to begin-
fling or end of calendar decade (years from 09 to 01); early decade
(years 2-3); mid-decade (years 4-6); and late decade (years 7-8).
The table below is based partly upon evidence in otherOccasional
'David M. Blank, The Volume of Residential Construction. 1889-1950, Technical
Paper 10 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954).
2Papers in the series and partly unpublished working memoranda in the
study and is not carried beyond the 1930's, since the intervention of
World \'Var II and uncertainties about current year levels limit the
value of any later dating.
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While timing relationships can be stated only with considerable
qualifications, several are of sufficient interest as possible leads to merit
note.
In general, the long swings in capital formation by railroads and
in residential construction arc synchronous, the single exception being
the somewhat earlier trough in the latter in the 1870's.
There is also fair synchronism between the long swings in capital
formation by railroads and in net immigration, although there is sonic
tendency for the latter to lead the former in the 1880's, 1890's, and
1930's
In general, net changes in foreign claims fall into reasonable
relation with those in capital formation by railroads and in residential
construction, when the former are cast as net capital imports. The
rationale for this lies in the fact that an expansion, i.e. an accelerated
rate of domestic capital formation (by railroads or in residential con-
struction), would attract more foreign capital and the opposite would
occur when the rate of domestic capital formation slackens.
4-.The number of long swings identified in gross national product
is the same as in all the other series. But until the 1920's the timing is
somewhat different from that in series relating to capital formation
3components: there is a distinct tendency before 1910for the timing
points in gross national productto precede those in capital formation.
The interrelations of long swingsin the various sectors of theecon-
omy obviously require further exploration, and theestimates for the
other utilities in Dr. Ulrncr's studyand for other industrialsectors in
the other monographs willcontribute additional light. Pendingsuch
further exploration,we can say oniy that these swingsarc important
for several economicprocesses, even before the wars of recent decades
put their stamp upon them; that theirpresence in capital formation
by railroads could probably beilluminated by the kind of analysisthat
has been brought to bearupon the long cycles in residential and other
construction - particularly since sucha large part of railroad capital
formation is construction ofroad; that there seem to be rationally
derivable relations between such swingsin population growth, at least
via immigration, in residentialconstruction and in railroad construction;
and that there are similarly reasonableeconomic relations between such
swings in domestic capital formationand in net capital imports. The
reasons for the disparity in timing bctween the swingsin gross national
product and in such importantcomponents of capital formationas
residential constructioi and capitalexpenditures by railroads are still
to be sought. But it is clear thatwe have here a type of movement the
nleasurement and analysis of which arc of theutmost importance to
the study of trends in the growth ofoutput and of capital.
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Dr. Ulmer's estimates showa striking decline in the capital-output
ratio over the six decades covered. Thehighest level of this ratio is in
the first year for which comparisoncaii be made, 1880, when it stood
at 16.4. By the end of the period, the ratiowas at an average level of
about 2)4, eveii ifwe exclude the exceptional years of World War II
when it dipped below 2.0 (in 1943and 1944). A downward trendin
this ratio was observed in othersectors aJso: in agriculture, from the
beginning of the period covered, i.e.since the l870's; and inmanu-
facturing and mining, wherea rise in the ratio to 1910-19 19 was
followed by a significant declineto the l940's (see other papers in this
series by Tostlebe, Creamer, and Borenstein).
4But some distinctive features aboutthe record for the railroads arc
worth noting. First, the periodbegins with capital-output ratiosfoi
the railroads far higher than thosefor other industries, ahhoughthey
arc possibly matched byratios in other public utilities.Second, perhaps
because of this exceptionally highlevel of the ratios for the steamrail-
roads at the beginning of the period,both the absolute and the propor-
tional decline was much greaterthan for agriculture or forinanufac-
turing. Both statements would beparticularly true if we confine the
comparison to reproducible fixedcapital and exclude the valueof
land. Third, the pattern of thedecline was different in the caseof
railroads. If we divide the whole time spaninto approximate halves
and distinguish the period1880 to 1915 (omitting World War1 years)
from that extending from 1915 tothe second half of the 1910's(omit-
ting World War II ycais), wefind that both the absolute andthe
proportional decline in the ratio wassignificantly greater in the first
than in the second period.
This pattern of movement canbe shown by a simplecalculation
which uses Dr. Ulmer's estimatesof capital and output in1929 prices
shown in the appendixes.As already noted the ratio in1880 was over
16, and it averaged (arithmetic meanof annual ratios) well over13
for the decade 1880-1889.For the decade 1905-1914 theratio aver-
aged about 4'/2. For the five years1945-1949 it averaged about 2V2.
Thus the ratio declined from1880 to 1915 by about 75 per cent;from
1915 to 1950 the decline wasless than 50 per cent. Thisretardation
in the decline of the ratiois clearly expressed by thefunction which
Dr. Ulmer fits to the seriesin Chart 6.
The movement in agriculture,manufacturing, and mining was quite
different: in the first period,before 1910-1919, the declinein the
capital-output ratio inagriculture was relatively mild,while the ratio
rose significantlyin both manufacturing andmining; it was in the
second period that the ratioin agriculture droppedprecipitously and
those in manufacturingand mining declined.
The reasons adduced byDr. Ulmer to explain thefull downward
sweep of thecapital-output ratios - overcapacityconnected with indi-
visibility of original units,technological improvements notreflected in
adjustments for pricechanges, the pressure ofcontinuous efforts for
more economical, moreintensive utilization of equipment - areat
5I
least partly relevant also to the explanation of the pattern of movement
of the ratio over this period. From 1880 to 1910, total capital stock
increased by between 80 to 9() per cent and barely doubled by 1913;
output rose almost sevenfold from 1880 to 1910 and almost eightfold
by 1913. But there was a rapid deceleration iii the rate of addition to
capital: from 1880 to 1895 the increase in the total stock was well
over 50 per cent; from 1895 to 1910 less than 20 per cent. The slow-
ing down and then virtual cessation of net additions to the track and
plant meant a rapid reduction of at least one major factor serving to
sustain the ratio-- existence of initial overcapacity created by building
large units with an eye to their future long-run performance load.
The slowing down of the decline in the capital-output ratio in the
second period can he traced to two aspects of growth of railroads since
1915. First, the extensive expansion of the railroad network was virtu-
ally at an end. Second, there was, hare!)' a decade after the (lividling
date, a virtual standstill iii the growth of output. Froma pre-Worid
War I output in 1929 dollars of somewhat over $4.5 billion, therewas
a rise to about $65 billion in mid-1920's and then a, decline, with the
latter level not exceeded until 1941. Thusa sul)stantial part of the
second period may have been characterized by under-utilization of
capacity, due not to the building-ahead characteristic of the nineteenth
century but to the leveling off and decline in the demand for services.
The tentative observations just made point to the promise ofmore
detailed comparisons than arc possible here. It would certainlybe most
interesting to juxtapose the movements of the capital stockand output,
during the distinctive periods described in railroads, other utilities,and
other major industrial sectors of theeconomy. For it should shed a
great deal of light on the responses of these various sectorsto the stimu-
lus of growing and slackening demand for their servicesand to the shift
from initial construction and extensive expansionto a period of more
intensive use of capital resources. It is quite probable thatdifferences
in the organizational structure of thesesectorsat one extreme the
large-scale utilities and at the other small-scale agriculture-- produced
differences in the response, particularly in thearea of capital forma-
tion. It is also possible that some important similaritieswill emerge, as
is already suggested by the prevalence of downwardtrends in the
capital-output ratios.
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In considering the trends infinancing, Dr. Uhuci had to takcinto
account riot only gross and netcapital formation representedby fixed
capital but all other assetsinventories, cash, receivables,securities,
etc. He was also compelled tooperate with balance sheetdata from
which, at least for the earlier periods,distortions caused by rcvalua-
tions could not be removed. Butfixed capital is by far the largest group
of assets used by the railroads; andthe weaknesses of the datafor the
earlier decades, while qualifying theresults, arc hardly of the kind to
cast serious doubt upon thevalidity of the major conclusion.
The latter can be stated simply.Between 1880 and WorldWar I
the overwhelming part of allof the additions to assets wasfinanced out
of sales of capital stock arid bonds -with only insignificant shares pro-
rided by additions to surplus,depreciation reserves, and short-term
credit. During the recent threedecades (from 1920 to the endof the
1950's) the contribution ofexternal financing through securitiesdwin-
dled to insignificance, and themajor sources of financing wereaddi-
tions to surplus and todepreciation reserves.
This conclusion as to the almostcomplete shift from "external" to
"internal" financing is subject to manyqualifications pointed out by
Dr. Ulmer in the text. Couldthe adjustments have beenmade, they
might have somewhat lessened thedominance of new security issues
as sources in theearlier period and of additions tosurplus and depre-
ciation charges in the later.But there is little doubt thatthis major
shift from external to internalfinancing occurred and that itsniagni-
tude was striking.
Indeed, given the trends in theaccumulation of real fixed capital
and in the volume of outputof the railroads, externalfinancing of gross
additions to its real durable assetscould hardly have continueddomi-
nant after World War I -except for financing by governmentunder
conditions resembling outrightsubvention or salvage creditextension.
In any calculation of thefinancing of net additions to realcapital, the
reduction of such net additions torelatively small magnitudes as the
growth of capital slackened toalmost a standstill wouldrender a
pro por1iora1 distribution amongpossible sources most erratic. If we
assume that in theabsence of substantial netcapital growth a properanalysis of sources of funds can be macic only for gross additions to
assets, it is inevitable that in an industry whose secular net growth of
capital has almost reached the saturation point, external financing of
the free market type cannot be a dominant source of funds. And if it
has been a dominant source earlier in the history of the industry, the
shift is, in a way, an inevitable corollary of the change in real capital
formation.
While we may expect parallel results in other industries, i.e.a simi-
lar association between relative importance of external financing and
substantial growth in net stock of durable capital during the earlier
phases of an industry's extensive expansion, anda similar decline in
the importance of external financing as the rate of net additionsto
stock of durable capital slackens, this shiftmay well have been exag-
gerated in the case of railroads. The exaggeration is due not onlyto
some of the unavoidable defects in Dr. Ulmer's estimates: the upward
valuation of physical property on the asset side and of securitieson
the liability side serves to raise the ratio of securities in total additions
to assets and so does the assumption that Dr. Ulmer had to makecon-
cerning absence of additions to depreciationreserves between 1880
and 1907. A more significant exaggeration is contributed by the dis-
tinctive position of railroads and some specific features of theirprac-
tices. As Dr. Ulmer observes, the railroadswere, until quite recently,
reluctant to set their depreciation rates at levelsmore consistent with
the economic obsolescence of their plant. And because oftheir organ-
ization and size, railroads had access to long-term securitymarkets that
was denied, or much more limited, to other industries whose technology
permitted them to operate efficiently in smaller units. Theirvery role
as public utilities made it possible for them to command fundson the
Iong-tenn security markets thatmany other capital-using industries
could not. Their relatively easy commandover sources of external
financing, as well as depreciation practices underestimatingtheir long-
term economic vulnerability, make the railroadsan exceptional case
exceptional in that the shift from long-term externalto internal financ-




The brief comments above are largely tentative reactions to the rich
and intriguing record that 1)r. Ulmcr sets forth in some detail in the
paper. They are intended to suggest part of the widerframework
within which Dr. Ulmer's findings may eventually be placed and to
which they will, in turn, contribute. But such a framework can be
effectively constructed only after the results of Dr. Ulmer's other
analyses, as well as of the studies by other members of our group, arc
completed; and it may well be that the suggestions above overlook
more important aspects or suggest conclusions thatwould not be sup-
ported by the results of further analysis.
Meanwhile, one can only urge the reader to turn to Dr. Ulmcr's
paper and observe the striking features of the long-termrecord of
capital formation and financing for an important and distinctive sector
of this country's economy.
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